I'd like to bring to my readers' attention, HIM
Reza Pahlavi's participation on Radio Sedaye Iran's (KRSI) "Besooye
Iran"
program on Saturday 7 April (2007) which can be accessed through the KRSI
archives:
http://www.krsi.net/archive/archive.asp?archive=4
or through this direct link:
http://www.krsi.net/medialinks/Radio...r-04-07-07.wma
The program will most likey be put on HIM Reza Pahlavi's official website within
a few days time:
http://www.rezapahlavi.org/
This exceptional solider of
Iran
deserves an entry for himself. Whenever the nation's security was in danger,
General Zahedi was there to defuse it - a
true Iranian hero!
***************
Mohammad Fazlollah Zahedi (1897-1963) was an Iranian general, Prime Minister, and politician.
Born in Hamedan in 1896, he was the son of Abol Hassan "Bassir Diwan" Zahedi, a wealthy land owner at the city of Hamedan, Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed general of the Iranian army at the age of 25. During his service at the Imperial Russian-trained Iranian Cossack Brigade, one of his comrades in arms (his superior in fact) was Reza Khan, the later Reza Shah Pahlavi. The alliance, forged between the two men, was to endure a lifetime and continued to bind their sons, personally as well as politically.
He served under Reza Pahlavi in the army later on, and was among the officers dispatched to Gilan who put an end to the Constitutionalist movement of Gilan of Mirza Kuchak Khan.
He was also involved in the overthrow of Seyyed Zia'eddin Tabatabaee's government in 1920. It was Colonel Zahedi who arrested Sheikh Khaz'al Khan and brought him to Tehran.
During Reza Shah's reign, General Zahedi was named (1926) military governor of Khuzestan province, holding the hub of Iran's oil industry, and in 1932 chief of national police, one of the nation's top internal posts. During World War II he was appointed (1941) commanding general of the Isfahan Division. Subsequent to the forced abdication of Reza Shah (1941), fuelled by British fears of an Alliance with Nazi Germany, Zahedi was arrested by British forces in 1942 for the same reasons, flown out of the country and interned in Palestine until the end of the war. A fierce nationalist, Zahedi fostered deep reservations and suspicions towards the Allied Forces.
Returned from exile in 1945, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (Reza Shah's son and successor), General Zahedi became Inspector of military forces in southern Iran. He became once more chief of national police (Shahrbani) in 1949, when Mohammad Reza Shah appointed him as chief of the Shahrbani Police Forces, in order to counter the growing threat of Sepahbod Haj Ali Razmara.
After retiring from the army, he was named Senator in 1950. During Hossein Ala''s Premiership Zahedi held the Post of Minister of the Interior (1951), which he retained during the initial period of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh's tenure. While Zahedi actively backed Mossadeghs nationalisation of Iran's oil industry, a move that antagonised the United Kingdom and the Western Powers, he was at odds with him over Mossadeghs increasing tolerance for the outlawed communist party Tudeh, which had seized the opportunity and boldly demonstrated for Iranian rights to its national resources. Zahedi finally fell out with Mossadegh, who accused him of fostering coup plans. Iran's oil-exports came to a standstill due to sanctions levied by the Western Powers, leading to considerable economic hardships at home, with painful impacts on the labour force. Riots by several tribes of southern Iran and destitute oil-field workers destabilised public life further and demands for political change grew nationwide. The USA, who had held "Mossy", the ailing and previously staunchly pro-American Dr. Mossadegh in high esteem, were fearing increasing communist influence over the situation and dropped their support for him.
As a result of the ensuing international crisis and Iran's political destabilisation, the Shah, encouraged by leading figures, in February of 1953 asked Prime Minister Mossadegh to resign,. Mossadegh refused to abide by the constitutional rights of the sovereign to dismiss him, provoking a national uprising. During a restive interlude Zahedi acted from underground in order to avoid imminent arrest. Shah supporters crowded the streets, calling for the Premier's ousting. Rebellious groups engaged in street-fights with forces loyal to Prime Minister Mossadegh as well as rallying members of the Iranian communist party "Tudeh" (the name implying "Masses").
In August of 1953 Mossadegh attempted to convince the Shah to leave the country. The Shah refused, and formally dismissed the Prime Minister, in accordance with the foreign intelligence plan. Mossadegh refused to resign, however, and when it became apparent that he was going to fight, the Shah, as a precautionary measure foreseen by the British/American plan, on 15th August flew to Baghdad and on from there to Rome, Italy, after hesitantly signing two decrees, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other nominating General Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister, subsequent to pressure from the US and UK intelligence agencies. By unconstitutionally refusing to cede power to his destined successor, subsequent to the Shah's dismissal, and foiling attempts to remove him by force, Mossadegh had factually staged a coup d'Etat.
Supported by the politics of the United Kingdom and the USA, and encouraged by the intelligence agents Kermit Roosevelt and Donald N. Wilber, General Fazlollah Zahedi staged a counter coup, drawing public and military support, which succeeded on the 19 August 1953. Legitimised by the Shah's decree, thousands of copies of which were publicly distributed as flyers, Zahedi proclaimed himself Prime Minister and the Shah returned triumphantly to Iran, from his brief exile in Rome, on the 22nd of August.
Many contemporary sources attribute the instigation of the counter coup entirely to foreign intelligence agencies, such as the U.S. American CIA ("CIA Coup") and the British MI6. Numerous books were published on the events surrounding the counter coup, often mixing facts and fiction. Sober reflection sheds due scepticism on assertions that two foreigners and a few local cooperators should have arbitrarily manipulated masses of (traditionally xenophobic) Iranians into action. In light of the fact, e. g., that the CIA later claimed to have lost all documentation relating to the coup events of 1953 in a fire, circulating narrations (often self-congratulatory) of alleged participating agents and other "insiders" need be regarded with due caution.
Having acquired an unprecedented power-base and, as a consequence, evoking
increasing unease at home, the Premiership of General Zahedi ended in
1955. His final exile was sweetened by
his last post, as
Ambassador to the
United Nations, in
Geneva.
Zahedi's family descends from the
Sufi
mystics
Sheikh Zahed Gilani (1216 - 1301) and
Sheikh
Safi Al-Din
Ardebili, the
eponym of the
Safavid Dynasty. Through his mother,
Djavaher Khanom, he traced his descent to the dynastic ruler
Karim Khan Zand. Married to Khadijeh
Pirnia, daughter of Mirza Hussein Khan Pirnia (titled
Motamen-ol-Molk), and granddaughter to
Mozzafar-al-Din Shah
Qajar (1853
-
1907), Fazlollah Zahedi had a son,
Ardeshir, and a daughter,
Homa.
His son Ardeshir Zahedi, a later politician and diplomat, was to marry Princess Shahnaz Pahlavi, daughter of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from his first marriage to Princess Fawzia of Egypt, daughter to King Fuad I.
I was reading up on past Iranian Prime Ministers (on wikipedia) and came
across this...
Oil Nationalization was not something that was all of a sudden brought to the
table by PM Mossadegh, before him PM Razmara was
pushing for it in a diplomatic and rational manner which was in the national
interest of Iran - unlike PM Mossadegh who acted radically, irrationally, and
emotionally endangering our national interests.
PM Razmara was assasinated by Islamists in 1951. Here is a brief intro to PM
Razmara from wikipedia that I came over.
PM Ali Razmara & Anglo-Iranian Oil Negotiations
Ali Razmara came closer than any other prime minister to successfully ratifying
the Supplemental Oil Agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
which would have improved the revenues paid to Iran by the company. The
Supplemental Agreement drew the ire of most Iranians and Majlis of Iran
deputies. because it provided less favorable terms than the Venezuela agreement
between the Standard Oil of New Jersey and the Venezuelan government or the
agreement between the Arabian-American Oil Company and the Saudi Arabian
government, and because it still surrendered some control of Iran's national
resources to a foreign company and country.
Razmara pressed the AIOC hard for better terms, and might have succeeded in
bringing the Majlis and the company to a workable compromise.
****************************
And on the 1953 Coup by PM
Mossadegh:
During Hossein Ala''s Premiership Zahedi held the Post of Minister of the
Interior (1951), which he retained during the initial period of Dr. Muhammad
Mossadegh's tenure. While Zahedi actively backed Mossadeghs nationalisation of
Iran's oil industry, a move that antagonised the United Kingdom and the Western
Powers, he was at odds with him over Mossadeghs increasing tolerance for the
outlawed communist party Tudeh, which had seized the opportunity and boldly
demonstrated for Iranian rights to its national resources. Zahedi finally fell
out with Mossadegh, who accused him of fostering
coup plans. Iran's oil-exports came to a standstill due to sanctions levied by
the Western Powers, leading to considerable economic hardships at home, with
painful impacts on the labour force. Riots by several tribes of southern Iran
and destitute oil-field workers destabilised public life further and demands for
political change grew nationwide. The USA, who had held "Mossy", the ailing and
previously staunchly pro-American Dr. Mossadegh
in high esteem, were fearing increasing communist influence over the situation
and dropped their support for him.
As a result of the ensuing international crisis and Iran's political
destabilisation, the Shah, encouraged by leading figures, in February of 1953
asked Prime Minister Mossadegh to resign,.
Mossadegh refused to abide by the constitutional
rights of the sovereign to dismiss him, provoking a national uprising. During a
restive interlude Zahedi acted from underground in order to avoid imminent
arrest. Shah supporters crowded the streets, calling for the Premier's ousting.
Rebellious groups engaged in street-fights with forces loyal to Prime Minister
Mossadegh as well as rallying members of the
Iranian communist party "Tudeh" (the name implying "Masses").
In August of 1953 Mossadegh attempted to convince
the Shah to leave the country. The Shah refused, and formally dismissed the
Prime Minister, in accordance with the foreign intelligence plan.
Mossadegh refused to resign, however, and when it
became apparent that he was going to fight, the Shah, as a precautionary measure
foreseen by the British/American plan, on 15th August flew to Baghdad and on
from there to Rome, Italy, after hesitantly signing two decrees, one dismissing
Mossadegh and the other nominating General
Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister, subsequent to pressure from the US and UK
intelligence agencies. By unconstitutionally refusing to cede power to his
destined successor, subsequent to the Shah's dismissal, and foiling attempts to
remove him by force, Mossadegh had factually
staged a coup d'Etat.
Supported by the politics of the United Kingdom and the USA, and encouraged by
the intelligence agents Kermit Roosevelt and Donald N. Wilber, General Fazlollah
Zahedi staged a counter coup, drawing public and military support, which
succeeded on the 19 August 1953. Legitimised by the Shah's decree, thousands of
copies of which were publicly distributed as flyers, Zahedi proclaimed himself
Prime Minister and the Shah returned triumphantly to Iran, from his brief exile
in Rome, on the 22nd of August.
A lot of falsehood surrounds the issue regarding the removal of PM Mossadegh of
Iran. Some have absurd claims that the CIA paid a crowd of a few hundred to
overthrow a so-called "popular" Prime Minister! Since these falsehoods seem to
have received more exposure than what the accounts of those who actually
witnessed and were involved in the events I'd like to post two accounts here
regarding this topic - one by former Imperial Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi and the
following by HIM Empress Farah Pahlavi. You be the judge on
WHAT REALLY TOOK PLACE.
********************
THE CIA AND IRAN -
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
Ardeshir Zahedi
http://www.ardeshirzahedi.org/cia-iran.pdf
http://www.ardeshirzahedi.org/main.html
On 16 April 2000, the New York Times published a story on what was presented as
a “secret report” by a CIA operative concerning the events of August 1953 in
Iran,. The following article is written in the interest of historical truth and
attempts to put those fateful events in Iran into prospect perspective.
At this time when the future of relations between Iran and the United States is,
once again, debated in public, it is important both sides steer clear of myths
that have fostered so much misunderstanding between them.
One such myth has been woven around the claim by a few CIA operatives that they
hatched a plot to get rid of Prime Minister Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh in August
1953 and (propelled my father, the later General Fazollah Zahedi into power with
the Shah’s blessings.) That claim, first made in the early 1960’s and never
corroborated by any hard evidence, has over the years found a niche in the
historical folklore of both nations. In a recent feature the New York Times gave
the claim fresh publicity, relaunching the debate over what actually happened in
Iran in those remote days of the Cold War.
Victory, of course, has a thousand fathers while defeat is an orphan. Had the
August 1953 efforts to remove Mussadeq from office failed, there would have been
no CIA ''heroes'' claiming the credit.
There is a mass of evidence, including US and Iranian official documents and
testimonies by people who played a role in the events that give the lie to the
CIA operatives’ claim. Briefly, what happened in August 1953 was as follows: the
Iranian political establishment was divided between supporters and opponents of
Mossadegh. Mossadegh’s opponents looked to the
Shah for a rallying point. My father who had served as Interior Minister in
Mossadegh’s Cabinet has broken with him and established himself as the leader of
the anti-Mossadegh faction.
The Shah was thus under pressure from many powerful circles and personalities
inside Iran to dismiss Mossadegh and name my
father as the new prime minister. Mossadegh
recognized my father as his chief adversary at the time and did all he could to
break him.
Mossadegh had been abandoned by many of his
former colleagues, among them such personalities as Hussein Makki and Mozzafar
Baqai, and opposed by parties that had provided the backbone of his support in
1951.
The most prominent members of the Shiite clerical establishment, including the
Ayatollahs Borujerdi, Hakim, Shahresetani and Kashani were solidly opposed by
Mossadegh and wanted the Shah to remove him. They
were all in contact with my father and supported him in their struggle against
Mussadeq.
A leading member of the Majlis (parliament) Hassan Haeri-Zadeh, who had been one
of Mossadegh’s strongest supporters until then, even cabled the United nations
secretary general to appeal for help against Mossadegh’s increasingly despotic
rule.
The Shah had already clashed with Mossadegh’s in 1952 and forced the ''doctor''
to resign as prime minister. At that time, however the ''politics of street''
had turned against the Shah and he had been obliged to reinstate
Mossadegh. In August 1953 the tide had turned
against Mussadeq who had further undermined his own position by disbanding the
parliament elected under his own stewardship.
The rest is history, as the saying goes. Or is it?
It is quite possible that the CIA and its British counterpart were engaged in
the usual dirty tricks campaign in Tehran. Tehran had become one of the hottest
''theaters'' of the Cold War with the Soviet Union enjoying a strong presence
through a mass Communist Party (the Toodeh), several front organizations and at
least four daily newspapers. The Communists had also infiltrated the armed
forces and the police, recruiting over 700 officers and NCOs.
What is certain is that Mossadegh’s fall was not due to any dirty tricks that
the CIA might have played. Nor did the CIA have the kind of access its
operatives claim to have had to the key figures of the revolt against
Mossadegh including my father. The only time my
father visited the US embassy in Tehran was a function in honour of Averell
Harriman on 4th of July 1951, and in his capacity as interior minister, Harriman
had come to Tehran with a mission from President Harry Truman to persuade
Mussadeq to find a way out of the crisis over the nationalization of Iranian
oil. (Cf. Vernon Walters in ''Silent Missions'').
My father never had any meetings with any CIA agents. One operative has claimed
that he spoke to my father in German, ostensibly during secret meetings. The
fact is that the only foreign languages my father ever spoke was Russian and
Turkish, not German or English.
Iranian history remembers my father as a true patriot who wore the wound he had
won in battle like so many badges of honour. Fazollah Zahedi had fought for
virtually every inch of what he regarded as the sacred land of Iran, against a
Bolshevik-sponsored regime along the Caspian coast to a British sponsored
secessionist movement in the oil rich province of Khuzestan. During the Second
World War had become a war prisoner of the British and sent into captivity and
exile in Palestine, then under British mandate. Fazollah Zahedi was always big
enough to fight his own fights, backed by his own loyal friends. To try and
portray such a giant of Iran’s contemporary history into a bit player in a
scenario fit for ''Mission Impossible'' requires a degree of cynicism that only
frustrated egomaniacs might master.
Throughout the dramatic events that led to the fall of Mussadeq, I was at my
father’s side as one of his principal political aides .Had he been involved in
any foreign intrigue I would have known, he was not.
Loy Henderson , the US ambassador to Tehran at the time, makes it abundantly
clear in his dispatches to the State Department that Mussadeq was overthrown by
a popular uprising which started from the poorest districts of the Iranian
capital. Henderson’s reports have been published in a book of more than 100
pages, translated into Persian and published in Iran.
The Iranian public, therefore, has a more balanced view of the events than its
American counterpart which is fed recycled claims by former CIA operatives.
British and Soviet accounts at the time also make it clear that Mussadeq had
fallen victim to his own hubris which antagonized his allies and forced the
Iranian people into revolt.
More than 100 books, by Iranian and American scholars, give the lie to the CIA
operatives ''self-congratulatory'' account.
Barry Rubin writes “It cannot be said that the United States overthrew Mussadeq
and replaced him with the Shah… Overthrowing Mussadeq was like pushing an open
door.”
Gary Sick writes ''The belief that the United States had single-handedly imposed
a harsh tyrant on a reluctant populace became one of the central myths of the
relationship, particularly as viewed from Iran.''
Amir Taheri writes “What happened was not a successful conclusion of a (CIA)
conspiracy but a genuine uprising provoked by economic hardship, political fear
and religious prejudice.”
Richard Helms, long time CIA director, told a BBC television program that '' the
agency did not counter rumours of in Iran because the Iranian episode looked
like a success. At the time, of course, agency needed some success, especially
to counter fiascos as the Bay of Pigs.''
Even Donald Wilber, the CIA operative whose ''secret report'' has been given top
billing by the New York Times makes it clear that whatever he and his CIA
colleagues were up to in Tehran at the time simply failed.
Wilbert writes:'' headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair…
The message sent to Tehran on the night of August 18 said that the operation has
been tried and failed and that contrary operations against Mussadeq should be
discontinued.''
Mossadegh was overthrown on 19 August when
hundreds of thousands to Tehranis poured into the streets to demand his
departure and the return of the Shah. This was not a military ''coup d’etat''
since there was no change in the constitution or any of the structures of the
Iranian state. Nor was the Shah’s position as head of state affected. Under the
constitution of 1906 the Shah had the power to name and dismiss prime ministers.
He simply exercised that power by dismissing Mossadegh
and nominating Zahedi in a perfectly legal and constitutional manner… Mussadeq
tried to resist his dismissal but was swept away by the masses.
The army played a supportive role in the anti-Mussadeq uprising and even then
only after the people had taken the initiative. At the time my father was no
longer on active service, having retired from the armed forces and engaged in
political activities as a senator and leader of the anti-Mussadeq coalition.
Mussadeq himself held the portfolio of Defence and enjoyed the support of many
key officers of the armed forces, including the Chief of Staff appointed by
himself.
Anyone who had studied the history of the turbulent years would also know that
Mossadegh was the most pro-American senior
politician Iran had produced. He was the darling of the Truman Administration
which raised the amount of aid to Iran, distributed through Point IV, from half
a million dollars to 23 million dollars. On August 18, 1953, a day before
Mussadeq fell, Henderson met Mussadeq and offered him an emergency loan of 10
million dollars on behalf of the Eisenhower Administration.
Mossadegh himself never blamed the Americans for
his downfall. He was intelligent enough to know why his political career led
into an impasse.
The anti-Mossadegh coalition did, of course, look to the United States, as the
leader of the Free World, to counter any ore than the soviets might have, made
at the time to intervene in what was a domestic Iranian power struggle. From a
geo-strategic point of view, therefore the anti-Mossadegh coalition regarded
itself as part of the Free World. But does that mean that all those who fought
Communism and upheld the cause of liberty throughout the Cold War were
manipulated by the CIA?
Three years ago the CIA announced that almost all of its documents pertaining to
the August 1953 events in Iran had been destroyed in a fire. Was someone trying
to cover up the CIA’s most dramatic ''success story''? Or did the documents burn
because the good ambiance created by the Iranian myth that had been fabricated
by a few individuals with a lot of imagination and very little of scruples?
***************************
Empress Farah Pahlavi's response to the New York
Times
Howell Raines Esq.
Editorial Page Editor,
The New York Times
229 West 43rd ST.
New York, NY 10036-3959
April 20, 2000
Dear Mr. Raines,
The article " a Secret C.I.A History" printed in the New York Times on April 16,
2000 renders a self-lauding, exaggerated, and partial account of the events of
1953. It also makes several erroneous and unfair remarks about my late husband,
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Contrary to what the so-called secret history
suggests, my husband's hesitation about dismissing Premier
Mossadegh did not result from his indecisiveness.
The Shah had strongly supported Dr.Mossadegh in the fight for the
nationalization of Iran's oil industry, agreeing with him that Iran had been
systematically exploited by the British and other foreign powers. For him, the
Premier's struggle to emancipate Iran's resources took precedence over all other
issue save protecting the nation's independence and territorial integrity.
Dr.Mossadegh misperceived the international array of economic and military
powers deployed against him and Iran. He overestimated the strategic importance
of Iran's oil to the Western world. The country was taken step by step to a
political and diplomatic impasse. Iran's economic and social conditions
deteriorated. The Communist Party grew inordinately in size and power,
penetrating several critical government institutions including the armed forces.
In the meantime, his former allies - the middle class, clerics, merchants, and
some members of the national front renounced him.
My husband supported Dr.Mossadegh as long as possible. For several months, he
resisted many members of the political elite, including several of the Premier's
former allies, who insisted that Dr. Mossadegh be
discharged. The Shah’s reluctance sprung partly from his wish to be certain that
deposing the premier accorded with Iran's constitution. It was only when the
Prime Minister arbitrarily dissolved the constitutionally elected Parliament,
and the Shah was convinced that the country's national independence and
territorial integrity were manifestly threatened, did he decide to dismiss
Dr.Mossadegh.
To claim that the Monarchy was saved in 1953 because of the C.I.A involvement
and that the late DR. Mossadegh was removed from
power with a sum of money is an insult to every Iranian.
The report says that the message sent to Tehran on the night of August 18th was
that " the operation has been tried and failed." The Monarchy was saved because
it was the will of all Iranians. While some selected documents produced by a
specific agency may indeed be conducive to the current disposition of a specific
administration, it would be wrong to assume any objective observer, be it an
Iranian or foreigner, base his opinion solely on such a limited account.
It is unfortunate that in an attempt to appease the current ruling clerics in
Iran, the government of the United States and increasingly the media have chosen
to disparage the late Shah of Iran without consideration of his pivotal role in
regional and world peace and his service to his country. It is equally
unfortunate that they choose to confuse the attitude of the present regime in
Iran towards the United States with that of the people of Iran.
The thirty-seven years of the Shah’s reign concurrent with the administration of
eight US Presidents shows a close and mutually
beneficial alliance for most of the time.
Contrary to recent statements by US officials, Iranian people never held animus
toward American before or after the events of 1953. Witness the friendship
Iranians extended to many American in Iran prior to the revolution and the
hospitality shown to the few Americans now traveling to Iran. In the interest of
the two peoples, it is essential that no one allow this misconception to cloud
sound judgment.
Iran will rise from her ashes.
Sincerely yours,
Farah Pahlavi